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Introduction  
 
Romania’s troubled legal past continues to stay an enigma for both legal historians 
and legal theorists alike. Coming to terms with the intricate legacy of the unjust law1 
brought by what we term today as the totalitarian experience, calls for a thorough 
engagement with the dialectical relation of continuity and discontinuity linking our 
arguably democratic present to the crises of the past. This hermeneutical and 
historical enterprise requires in itself not only a necessary interdisciplinary gaze but 
also a specific focus on ‘the fraying edges of the law’2, on its pathology3 and on its 
shifts from one regime of legality to another. In following this line, my aim is to put 
under scrutiny the obscure passage from conservative authoritarian and fascist4 
regimes towards the Stalinist dictatorship of the late 1940s in Romania. 
Consequently my purpose is to analyse the role played by the process of 
                                   
* This text developed out of my interventions at the 9th Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law (19 September 2009), 
Poznań, Poland, the Genealogies of Memory Project Conference 2013 (27 November 2013), Warsaw, Poland and 
from my visiting lectureship at the Sorbonne School of Law (March and December 2015). I thus wish to thank the 
organizers and participants at these conferences especially Ulad Belavusau, Saygun Gokariksel, Ronnie Lippens 
and Stephen Skinner for their helpful comments. I am also indebted to Pierre Legrand for his kind invitation 
allowing me to refine my argument within the framework of the seminar I delivered in Paris. I am further 
grateful to Andru Chiorean, David Fraser and Simon Lavis for their generous interest in my work. I am, of 
course, thankful to the editors for their invaluable work in setting up this volume. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
translations are mine. Needless to say, the usual disclaimer applies: I am responsible for any remaining errors or 
omissions. This chapter is for J. and N. 
1 See Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’, Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 1 S 
(1946), at 105 [‘unrichtiges Recht’].  
2 Willy Maley, ‘Beyond the Law : The Justice of Deconstruction’, Law and Critique 10 (1999) 49-69, at 50. 
3 See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1994) at 117-123.  
4 I borrow this distinction from Roger Griffin. See, Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1991) at 32-36.  
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criminalisation of the authoritarian past both in the attempt at ideological 
legitimation carried out by the Romanian Communist faction as well as in the 
broader legal and political framework of the time. I thus intend to explore how the 
criminal law-based discursive construction addressing the military dictatorship of 
1941-1944 as a criminal enterprise affected the Romanian state’s later legal 
morphology and its ideological tenets. Equally, my intention is to inquire on the 
memorial consequences of this mapping of the Antonescu regime and to underline 
the semiotic and political weight of this legacy. I propose to do so by drawing on the 
paradoxes entailed by the state of exception, understood here as a philosophical 
category aiming to investigate the ontological tenets of law and able to offer an 
insight into the structural legal, historical and symbolic limits of reconstructing the 
nomos in modernity5. From this point of view I shall argue that the post-war trials 
and the legal framework of the time seeking to address past injustices related to the 
World War 2 failed to mark a return to a stable polity grounded in a coherent 
normative construct. The central failure of this project of judging the past relates to 
the particular way in which it came short of addressing the material history of the 
Holocaust and articulated the experience of the war. According to the reading I 
advance in this chapter, this specific failure of the post-war trials took the form of an 
ideological sublimation of the central positions of the legal and memorial drama at 
stake, that is, the perpetrators and the victims. By eliding this pivotal ethical 
distinction in reading the past in order to articulate a constitutional narrative of 
national and constitutional continuity, the Antonescu trial failed to address the 
politico-legal mechanism at the core of the Holocaust – the legalized production of 
homines sacri6. This chapter asserts that the post-war trials limitations were the result 
of a nexus of socio-legal factors such as the presence of a politically charged 
                                   
5 Giorgio Agamben, State of exception trans. Kevin Attell (University of Chicago Press, 2005 [2003]), at 87. 
6 One could thus speak of ‘Auschwitz as a site not of extermination, but as the site for the production of material 
to be destroyed, the ultimate logic of modernity, capitalism and bio-power in the service of the racial vision of 
the Nazi State’: David Fraser, ‘Dead Man Walking: Law and Ethics after Giorgio Agamben’s Auschwitz’, 
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 12 (1999) at 404.  
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situation, the theoretical scarcity of Stalinism as an intellectual frame influencing 
legal representation as well as the discursive power of nationalist ideology already 
embedded in the legal framework.  
 
In order to approach the legal and constitutional confusion reigning in the 
interregnum emerging at the end of World War 2, I shall first address the conceptual 
framework of the state of exception as developed in the work of Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben. This step seems necessary first as a matter of historiographical 
inquiry inasmuch as Agamben’s paradigm is able to underline the ambiguous status 
of legal discourse in the interwar and World War 2 Romanian context, that of both 
being caught in the totalitarian maelstrom and of positively taking part in the reign 
of state sanctioned violence. Second, as a matter of jurisprudential inquiry, the 
concept of exception enables us to circumvent, even if only provisionally, the 
entrenched theoretical positions of reading the law in totalitarian contexts as a 
‘legislative monstrosity’7, ‘statutory lawlessness’8, or ‘laws [that] may be law but 
[are] too evil to be obeyed’9, which, each in their own way, tend to eschew law’s 
manifold embeddedness in a modernity gone awry. It might also compel us to reflect 
on the legal and political nature of such regimes and avoid semantic and legal 
confusions that all too often insinuate themselves in the analysis of totalitarianism10. 
Last, and this time as a matter of critical inquiry, the paradigm of the exception 
could be at least serviceable in offering a map of the areas in which law, understood 
as a structured symbolic discourse, fails in articulating and thus limiting historical 
violence.  
 
 
                                   
7 Lon L Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’, Harvard Law Review  71 (1958), at 654.  
8 Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht’, at 107. 
9 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review  71 (1958), at 620. 
10 With specific reference to Antonescu’s dictatorship, Romanian constitutional historians limit themselves to 
stating that it is ‘difficult to define’. For such an example, see Eleodor Focșeneanu, Istoria Constituțională a 
României: 1859-2003, 3rd edn (Bucharest, 2007), at 124. 
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Beyond the Law: the State of Exception 
 
To begin with, the state of exception is a limit-concept for legal theory 
inasmuch as it questions the basic assumptions of continental legal thought and 
disturbs the cardinal distinction between the normative and the descriptive. As 
Agamben argues, ‘exceptional measures […] find themselves in the paradoxical 
position of being juridical measures which cannot be understood in legal terms’11. 
His analysis, finds its departing point in the somewhat peculiar juridico-political 
structure present in constitutional practice and constitutional framework of the 
Western tradition since eighteenth century12 consisting in either the suspension of 
constitutional guarantees or of the whole constitutional process for a series of actions 
taken by state authorities with the aim of protecting the constitutional order.  
 
By focusing at this ambiguous practice of going beyond the law in order to 
uphold its mere existence, Agamben defines the state of exception as a zone of 
indistinction in the structure of the law13, thus isolating a conceptual area where it is 
logically impossible to make any relevant distinction between law and fact. It is 
through this “suspension” of the legal, that a zone of indistinction between fact and 
norm, between force and form, is opened within the fabric of the symbolic 
framework that would have otherwise been arguably able to sustain the distinction 
between law and violence and ultimately between politics and life14. As Agamben 
writes, following Carl Schmitt, ‘[s]ince “there is no rule that is applicable to chaos”, 
chaos must first be included in the juridical order through the creation of a zone of 
indistinction between outside and inside, chaos and the normal situation — the state 
of exception’15.  
                                   
11 Giorgio Agamben, State of exception trans. Kevin Attell (University of Chicago Press, 2005 [2003]), at 1.   
12 Ibid., at 11-24.  
13 Ibid,, at 41.  
14 Ibid., at 88. 
15 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford University 
Press, 1998 [1995]), at 19. 
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The paradox of the exception should be now apparent. Do such legal 
measures fall under the category of legally or constitutionally justified measures? Or 
are they purely and simply facts that are indistinguishable from law inasmuch as the 
law has been debased to the ‘force of law’16 always already underlining its existence 
yet never actualised outside the realm of exception17? And if this is the case, what is 
the legal meaning, if there is one, of the acts undertaken under the seal of the 
exception? It is precisely in this sense that the suspension of the law blurs the 
borders between the stability traditionally attributed to legal normativity and its 
exterior: ‘[T]he situation created in the exception has the peculiar characteristic that 
it cannot be defined either as a situation of fact or as a situation of right’.18 However, 
it should be noted that the paradox entailed by the state of exception is not a merely 
a case arising out of law’s incompleteness, one for which the law does not provide 
any provision or guidance thus compelling the judge to exercise discretion19, but 
purely and simply the status of the legal order within modernity. As Agamben 
observes, ‘[l]aw is made of nothing but what manages to capture inside itself 
through the inclusive exclusion of the exceptio: it nourishes itself on this exception 
and is a dead letter without it’20.  
 
While the concept of exception is a central one for both philosophical and 
jurisprudential inquiry by bringing to the fore the possibility of law’s disappearance 
as a normative category, for the purposes of this chapter I shall try to explore its 
historiographical and memorial value. This is because the initial theoretical thrust of 
the concept of exception captures the conceptual grey-zone within the law as 
primarily a consequence of the accumulation of historical tension and acceleration of 
                                   
16  Agamben, State of exception, at 32-44. 
17 Anton Schütz, ‘Thinking the Law With and Against Luhmann, Legendre, Agamben’, Law and Critique 11 (2000), 
at 117. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Hart, Concept of Law, at 252. 
20 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life at 19.  
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time specific to the modern able to paradoxically unravel its ancient origins. 
Moreover, Agamben’s construction of the concept gives a central place to the history 
of the interwar and World War 2 if only by examining at some length the 
paradigmatic case of article 48 of the Weimar Constitution21. Indeed, echoes of this 
troubled history seem to be the frontispiece from which the Agambenian 
archaeological inquiry excavating the problematic tension between law and 
lawlessness starts. Perhaps not least, the intellectual and material history of the 
concept is intimately linked to the dissolution of experience specific to the interwar 
not only through its theorisation within legal and theoretical circles on the continent 
during the interwar and wartime, but also through the proliferation of ‘states of 
exception’ which have opened the path to the creation of camps and the 
extermination undertaken during the war. For inasmuch as the exception was a part 
of the legal discourse of the interwar and wartime authoritarianism, it was also 
embodied through a manifold set of material practices which found themselves at 
the core of the production of extermination, racial and ethnic cleansing and the 
ascent of total war22. From this vantage point, reading the post-war trials through the 
lenses of the exception would enable us to shed a new light on the hidden structural 
limits of the politico-legal pitfalls of the Eastern European post-war period. Equally, 
such a conceptual framework could also enable us to look beyond the all too often 
assumed cynical political goals aimed by Stalinism in its project of communist 
takeover and to critically engage with the legal and ideological choices the actors of 
post-war faced within their own intellectual and discursive constraints.  
 
Law, Dictatorship, Fascism 
 
                                   
21 Ibid., at 14-16. 
22 Evocative of this relation between the intellectual history of the concept of exception and Romanian legal 
history is Carl Schmitt’s presence in Bucharest in 1943 on the occasion of a conference on the ‘Historical 
Condition of European Jurisprudence’, let alone his acquaintance with Romanian intellectual figures of the far-
right: Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000), at 246-247.  
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Four constitutional moments have marked political life in Romania prior to and 
during its participation in World War 2. Firstly, one can note the instauration of the 
Royal Dictatorship of King Carol II through the proclamation of the new constitution 
in 193823 replacing the Constitution of 192324, as well as the subsequent suppression 
of political parties25. Another significant moment is King Carol II’s abdication in 
194026 as a result of the territorial losses towards the USSR, Bulgaria and Hungary 
during the summer of 1940 and of the pressures orchestrated by Marshal Antonescu, 
prime-minister at that time, backed by other political forces inimical to the royalist 
faction27. The abdication was ensued by the instauration of Marshal Antonescu’s 
military dictatorship and the proclamation of the National Legionary State28. In a 
first stage, the new regime was supported by the Romanian main fascist movement, 
the Iron Guard. As a consequence, Romania soon signed the Tripartite Pact and 
entered into the Axis’ sphere of influence29. As early as January 1941, the Iron Guard, 
put an end to their collaboration with the military dictator and fully contested the 
Marshal’s authority as head of state. The conflict resolved itself in an intervention of 
the Army, backed by German assent, quelling the fascist rebellion. After three years 
of war against the USSR, following the fall of the front in Ukraine, King Michael – 
who has only nominally ruled the country – conducted a coup d’état deposing the 
Marshal and signed an armistice with the Allies. This opened the way to a partial 
restoration of the Constitution of 1923. 
  
                                   
23 The Romanian Constitution of 1938, Monitorul Oficial (M.Of. hereafter), 27 Februray 1938. 
24 The Constitution of Romania, M. Of., 29 March 1923. 
25 Decree Law concerning the suppression of associations, factions and political parties of the 30th of March 1938, 
M.Of., 30 March 1938.  
26 See, ‘King’s Carol II Manifesto to Romanians of the 6th of September 1940’, in Ioan Scurtu, România şi marile 
puteri (1933-1940): Documente (Bucharest: Editura Fundaţiei România de Mâine, 2000), at 232.  
27Vlad Georgescu, Romanians : A History, trans Alexandra Bley-Vorman (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1991), at 210.  
28 Statute no. 550 of 14th September through which the Romanian State becomes a National Legionary State, 
M.Of., 14th September 1940.  
29 Georgescu, Romanians : A History, at 212-213.  
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 These constitutional moments are not only symptomatic for a broad range of 
political, legal and symbolic ambiguities specific to the fascist takeover in Romania 
or to Romania’s participation in the war and, but are also at the origins of the later 
legal and memorial intricacies of the post-war context. Thus it may prove serviceable 
to take a closer look at their intrinsic tensions as well as at the ways in which they 
affected the overall framing of the legal system.  
 
For many a historiographer of the Romanian interwar, the royal dictatorship 
of 1938 stands as a first assertion of full authoritarian powers, and it thus marks the 
beginning of Romania’s fall in the realm of totalitarianism30. Consequently, the 
Constitution of 1938 is retrospectively read as being endowed with a great deal of 
symbolic signification. As such, it is the very legal mechanism that separates 
democracy from totalitarianism. At a closer look, one may observe that the process 
of dissolution of legality and the ‘breakdown of democracy’31 was anything but 
linear and it was rather build upon an accumulation of gradual increase of executive 
unregulated power during the interwar. The dissolution of the law during the 
interwar took various forms such as the use of the state of siege, the recourse to 
government by decree32, the direct nomination of governments or the practice of 
passing of legislation criminalising political activities33.  
 
The constitutional system of the interwar could be safely termed as ‘semi-
authoritarian’34, and was one that decidedly relied on a constant recourse to 
                                   
30 Id., 198-199; Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 (Oxford University Press, 1994), at 421.  
31 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), at 137.  
32 Constantin Dissesco, ‘L’évolution du droit public roumain,’ in Les transformations du droit dans les principaux 
pays depuis cinquante ans: livre du cinquantenaire de la Société de législation comparée (Paris: L.G.D.J, 1922), at 301. 
33 I have discussed the historical and jurisprudential consequences of this thread of legal measures elsewhere: 
Cosmin S Cercel, ‘The Enemy Within: Criminal Law and Ideology in Interwar Romania’ in Stephen Skinner (ed.) 
Fascism and Criminal Law: History, Theory, Continuity (Oxford: Hart, 2014), 101-126. 
34 Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 44.  
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unregulated state power35. However, it was still a regime that at least formally was 
committed to the tenets of modern constitutionalism36 insofar as it guaranteed the 
classical liberal freedoms and still tried to legitimise their limitation or suspension 
through exceptional circumstances. For its part, the royal dictatorship stands for a 
new constitutional regime that cuts itself with the tenets of traditional forms of 
legality and the creeds of the liberal state. It also marks the entry into a new regime 
of power and the emergence of a fragile albeit violent resolution of the conflict 
opposing the King on one hand, the democratic political forces on the other and the 
rising power of Romanian fascist movement, the Iron Guard. In this conflict, which 
is laden with ideological ambiguities and political intricacies inasmuch as during 
one decade each side collaborated to some extent with the other37, one can easily 
grasp the symptoms of a society caught by an ethos of crisis38. The dictatorship of 
1938 is thus an ambiguous attempt at countering fascism through its own means, 
including unbridled state violence, anti-Semitic legislation and administrative 
practices as well as the staging of ultranationalist ideology39.  
 
The emergence of the National Legionary State came as a result of the New 
Order of Europe entailed by the opening hostilities of World War 2 and the sudden 
defeat of France, one of the main guarantors of Romania’s sovereignty after the 
Great War. The territorial losses, the growing local dissent at the wake of the war as 
well as the growth of popularity of the far-right, prompted the King to set a new 
government with Marshal Antonescu as a Prime-Minister. Although a second-rank 
figure in the political spectrum of the interwar, Antonescu was revered to as an 
                                   
35 Between 1918 and 1928 no fewer than 12 decrees were issued, instituting or upholding the partial or general 
state of siege: Valentin Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu: doctrină, jurisprudentă și legislație (Bucharest: Cartea 
Românească, 1939), 32–45. 
36 Georgescu, Romanians: A History, at 198–99. 
37 Rebecca Ann Haynes, ‘Reluctant Allies? Iuliu Maniu and Corneliu Zelea Codreanu against King Carol II of 
Romania,’ The Slavonic and East European Review 85 (2007) 105-134. 
38 For an insightful analysis of the relation between fascism and the crisis of liberal democracies during the 
interwar see Roger Griffin, ‘Modernity Under the New Order: The Fascist Project for Managing the Future’, in A 
Fascist Century, ed. Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 24-45 at 44.  
39 Georgescu, Romanians : A History, at 208.  
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uncontested moral and military authority to such an extent that his growing 
popularity, pro-German activities and defiance of the King determined the latter to 
assign him on home arrest prior to nominating him as Prime-Minister40. One of the 
first measures taken by Antonescu in this capacity was to force the King to delegate 
him the reserved powers. Later on, he pressured for his abdication. As Carol’s son, 
Prince Michael, was approaching majority, he was crowned as a King, while the 
Marshal effectively held executive powers as the Head of the State – Conducător.  
 
While the new regime symbolically termed itself as overtly fascist, it also 
uneasily mitigated the tension between the conservative-leaning militarism of the 
Marshal and the ‘revolutionary’41 tendencies of the Iron Guard42. The latter was 
constantly pressuring for direct action against the Jewish minority as well as for 
retaliation against former central figures of the Royal Dictatorship. The dualism 
between military authoritarianism and fascism purely and simply could be mainly 
observed at the organisational level of the administration. As such, unsurprisingly, 
the Army, the Gendarmerie as well as the Secret Services were under the control of 
Antonescu and its loyal followers. On the other hand, the Ministry of Interior, the 
police and the government’s representations in the territory (Prefecturi) were 
controlled by the Iron Guard43. The latter was further backed by the Legionary 
Police, a para-military force organised after the model set-up by the SA and the SS44. 
The tension reached a peak as a result of the series of executions perpetrated by the 
Legionary Police and the assassination of former prime-minister and noted 
Romanian nationalist historian Nicolae Iorga. Moreover, the Guard exacted taxes 
upon the Jewish population without any legal ground and started an entire 
                                   
40 Denis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), at 47-48.  
41 Mircea Platon, ‘The Iron Guard and the Modern State. Iron Guard Leaders Vasile Marin and Ion I. Moța and 
the “European New Order”’, Fascism 1 (2012), at 69. 
42 Aristotle Kallis, Genocide and Fascism: The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe (London: Routledge, 2009), at 221. 
43 International Commission on The Holocaust in Romania, Final Report, eds. Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid and 
Mihail E. Ionescu (Iași: Polirom, 2004), at 109. 
44 Ibid., at 110.  
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campaign of expropriation and deportation of Jewish communities45. These policies 
culminated in the Bucharest Pogrom perpetrated as a first stage of the Legionary 
Rebellion. Taking control over the Police Headquarters, police stations and several 
ministries, the Guardists launched their attack on the Army. The Guardist Ministry 
of Interior ordered setting on fire the Jewish districts in Bucharest, the action being 
followed by a series of deportations, executions and random shootings exacted 
mainly by the Corps of Legionary Workers46, the trade-union based branch of the 
Iron Guard. Started on the 21nd of January, the uprising was quelled by the 24th by 
the Army. The main outcome was the proclamation of the National and Social State 
under the rule of Marshal Antonescu supported by a technocratic government.  
 
The deposition of the fascist movement was not however a return to any form 
of classical constitutionalism or to any democratic stand. As the country soon 
ventured in the ‘crusade against Bolshevism’47, by joining the German Barbarossa 
Plan, the situation would evolve further in changing Romania into an overt 
ultranationalist polity. As such, the military dictatorship soon implemented further 
anti-Semitic legal and administrative measures on Romanian territories as well as in 
the occupied territories under Romanian administration. The racial policies devised 
against Jewish and Roma population, this time with legal and administrative minute 
backed by military warring ethos, are at the origins of the darkest moment in 
Romanian history48. The intermingling between dictatorship understood as the 
suspension of the legal system, the war-time conditions marked by the dissolution of 
the categories of limited war, and the discursive hegemony of state-racism in 
national ideology, all point towards a limit-state of political, legal and ethical 
categories founding the state. The National Social State under Antonescu is thus a 
                                   
45 Ibid., at 110-115. See also Kallis, Genocide and Fascism, at 221.   
46 International Commission on The Holocaust in Romania, Final Report, at 110.  
47 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, at 81.  
48 Vladimir Solonari, Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 168-199. With regard to the policies of “Romanianization”, see 
also Ștefan Cristian Ionescu, Jewish Resistance to “Romanianization” (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).   
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nekropolitical49 enterprise in which the state and law were reduced to a mere formless 
existence, but were nonetheless necessary constituents and accomplices of the 
‘eliminationist drive’50. It was thus actualised the ultimate hidden structure of the 
modern state under the guise of ‘state racism’51, enabling both the legal and political 
apparatus to recreate the old sovereign right of killing within the resolutely modern 
framework of biopolitical power.  
 
The Antonescu regime is now held liable for Romania’s participation in the 
Holocaust which has been accounted as a death toll ranging from 280 000 to 380 000 
Jews52, executed, killed or disappeared as a result of the government’s policies in 
Romania and Romanian-occupied territories. As it has been stated, ‘of all the allies of 
Nazi Germany, Romania bears responsibility for the deaths of more Jews than any 
country other than Germany itself’53. Moreover, as Dan Stone convincingly argues, 
‘the murder of the Jews of Romania (excluding northern Transylvania, ceded to 
Hungary in 1940) and Transnistria was essentially an independent undertaking’54  
However not only it took 60 years for Romanian authorities to fully recognise the 
scale of the persecutions exacted against Jewish and Roma population, but many of 
the political, legal and symbolical intricacies of the Holocaust still continue to haunt 
both the state’s self-representation as well as Romanian legal discourse. 
Approaching the first legal encounters with the memory of the Holocaust inside the 
legal framework itself is not only a crucial task in understanding the path from one 
regime to another, but also the ways in which national and state ideology have been 
constructed through the ethico-legal rendering of this dark period.  
  
                                   
49 Achille Mbembe, ‘Nécropolitique’, Raisons politiques, 2006, n° 21, at 34.  
50 Kallis, Genocide and Fascism, at 251-255.  
51 Michel Foucault, Il faut défendre la société (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), at 213-35. 
52 International Commission on The Holocaust in Romania, Final Report, at 179.  
53 Ibid., at 385.  
54 Dan Stone, Histories of the Holocaust (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 36. 
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Judging the Disaster: Law and Historical Violence 
  
This line of inquiry draws us to a closer analysis of the fourth constitutional moment 
closing the series of war-time dictatorships. Indeed, the short, partial and fragile 
return to democratic and constitutional ‘normality’ between 1944 and 1947 marks 
both a politically charged and cultural significant interregnum laden with far-
reaching consequences for the fate of Romanian nomos as well as for later Romanian 
communist ideology and praxis. As such, the return of democracy is also 
paradoxically linked to the entry into stage of history of institutionalized, if not 
already state-steered, communism. In short, the coup d’état staged by King Michael of 
Romania backed by different factions of the Romanian army and Romanian politics – 
such as the National Democratic Bloc (that would comprise National Liberals, the 
Peasants’ Party, Social Democrats and Communists) on the 23rd of August 1944 
ousted the military dictator and was soon ensued by an Armistice agreement with 
the Allies55. The Constitution in 1923 was partially put again into force by a decree 
dating from August 194456 which thus formally ended Antonescu’s rule. 
 
 However, under the Armistice agreement, parts of the traditional sovereignty 
of the state were questioned inasmuch as the Soviet Union had ‘monopoly of 
interpretation of the Agreement’ which it exercised through an intentionally unclear 
formulation of the legal status of the concluding parties57. Moreover, the Agreement 
already imposed rather unusual obligations which, considering Romania’s 
participation in the war until the 23rd of August seem just and reasonable, but 
nonetheless question the traditional forms of sovereignity. As such, according to the 
                                   
55 Richard J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the XXth Century and After, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1997), at 228-31. 
See also Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, Return to Diversity [:] A Political History of East Central Europe 
Since World War II, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2000), at 105-06; Georgescu, Romanians: A History, at 220.  
56 High Royal Decree no. 1626 concerning the establishment of the Rights of Romanians within the frame of the 
Constitution of 1866 as modified by the Constitution of 1923, 31st of August 1944, M. Of., 2 September 1944, n° 
202. 
57 See e.g. the wording of the Armistice Agreement determining the Allied powers in an ambiguous manner 
alternating the reference between Allied and Soviet powers.  
 14 
Articles 14 and 15 of the Agreement, the Romanian state was bound to ‘undertake to 
collaborate with the Allied (Soviet) High Command in the apprehension and trial of 
persons accused of war crimes’ and to ‘dissolve all pro-Hitler organizations (of a 
Fascist type) situated in Rumanian territory, whether political, military or para-
military, as well as other organizations conducting propaganda hostile to the United 
Nations, in particular the Soviet Union, and will not in future permit the existence of 
organizations of that nature.’58. In retrospect, the provisions of the Agreement are 
regarded by historians and constitutionalists nothing short of a Soviet ‘mechanism of 
takeover’59 in Romania60. 
 
From a legal perspective the constitutional framework of the time remained 
highly problematic as long as Sections III and VI of the August Decree restating the 
Constitution of 1923 leave out of its scope the functioning of the legislative and the 
judiciary61. It would be thus safe to affirm that the regime of exceptional measures 
outside the scope of the constitutional control continued to be in power before the 
new constitution of 1948 introducing the dictatorship of the proletariat would be 
affirmed. This legal uncertainty determined partly some of the political 
developments in Communist takeover as well as the process of dealing with the 
Fascist and authoritarian past. In this sense, the passing of the Statute no. 312 of 1945 
seeking to prosecute and punish those responsible for bringing the disaster of the 
country and war crimes62 takes place in an ambiguous constitutional context.  
 
                                   
58 Section 14 and 15 of The Armistice Agreement with Rumania, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/rumania.asp. [last checked on the 5th of May 2014].  
59 Denis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2005), 245.   
60 ‘The Allied Control Commission formed to oversee the armistice was entirely Soviet-dominated. Its American 
and British members did not even have the right to travel freely in Romania without the permission of the Soviet 
authorities’: Georgescu, Romanians : A History, at 223.  
61 High Royal Decree no. 1626.  
62 Statute no. 312 of the 24th of April 1945 for the prosecution and punishment of those responsible for the 
disaster of the country and war crimes, M.Of., 24th of April 1945. 
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At this stage, one may legitimately ask who or which is the institutional body 
asserting the sovereignty by framing the legal definition of a crime and by creating 
categories necessary to the process of criminalisation? The ‘positive’ legal answer lies 
within the emitent of the Statute, which was the Ministry of Justice. Interestingly for 
the purposes of this chapter, the office of the Ministry of Justice was held by one of 
the few local prominent leaders of the Communist Party, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu63. A 
more complex answer would seek to take into account the inherently ‘constitutional’ 
dimension of such a statute. Indeed, what symbolically it is created through the 
process of criminalisation of the former dictatorship is also a form of discursive 
production of alterity. The new regime therefore marks its difference in respect to 
the criminal other and draws its own legitimacy from positing this difference. 
Through this process of criminalisation of the past, a foundational myth of the state 
is reconstructed and narrated once again.  
 
The fact that the communist movement was in charge of the prosecution and 
conviction of the crimes is of course not surprising inasmuch as Soviet troops were 
present in Romania and the movement was slowly trying to rebuild its presence in 
public life. The situation provided also the Communists with the opportunity not 
only to tackle the issue of the authoritarian and fascist state violence to which most 
of them would have been victims, but also create their basis for a new legitimising 
framework. To put it simply, in contradistinction to the authoritarian dictatorships 
of the late interwar the Communist movement had the chance to present itself as a 
guardian of democracy and a bearer of an authentic democratic ethos – after all the 
Communist party was part of the National Democratic Bloc. This is not to say that 
the trial of war criminals was mainly a matter of communist politics. Rather my 
claim is that the way in which the actions of the authoritarian regimes were legally 
framed as crimes in the early years of postwar through an intricate process 
                                   
63 Crampton, Eastern Europe in the XXth Century and After, at 225. 
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symbolisation in which national ideology and state responsibility played a key role. 
A notable part of the politico-legal context of the time was held by the shifting role of 
the Communist movement, which was the main proxy between the established 
power in Bucharest and the ‘Allied (Soviet) High Command’.  
 
 Whilst the framing of the Statute seeking to address Romania’s participation 
in the war and the atrocities committed is rather ambiguous in terms of criminal law 
wording, as, for instance, the responsibility is defined in relation to persons rather 
than with acts, while the crime of ‘bringing the disaster upon the country’ is not 
defined anywhere else64, it also hints to a series of other constitutional and 
ideological underpinnings. Indeed, the choice of words is symptomatic inasmuch as 
‘country’ (țara) was by no means a criminal law category and hardly a modern 
constitutional one. Whereas in common language the country and the state might be 
interchangeable, under the already modern Romanian legal system of the time, ‘the 
country’ did not have a proper juridical meaning. It had, however one specific 
meaning as a constitutional archaism traceable back to the Middle Ages – that is the 
constitutional body which ultimately legitimized the Prince in the elective 
monarchies of 14-18th century65. Given that Antonescu used the term Conducător 
(Leader) in defining his office – which was already a constitutional archaism as it 
evoked one of the offices of the Voyvod title of the Middle Ages – it can be inferred 
                                   
64 Article 1 defined those ‘guilty of the disaster brought on the country’ as a) persons who had backed Hitler or 
espoused fascism and who bore the political responsibility for allowing German troops to enter Romania; and b) 
persons who had given their support to the above deeds, either in speech, writing or by any other means. Article 
2 proclaimed those ‘guilty of the disaster brought on the country through the commission of war crimes’ as 
persons who had taken the decision to declare war on the Soviet Union and the United Nations, who had treated 
prisoners in an inhuman manner, who had ordered or carried out acts of terror or cruelty against the population 
in the war zones, who had taken repressive measures against civilians out of racial or political motives, and who 
had ordered forced labour or the deportation of people. Conviction under article 1 carried imprisonment for a 
term of between five years and life, while that under article 2 attracted forced labour for life or the death penalty: 
Statute no. 312 of the 24th of April 1945. 
65 See for instance, G. I. Bratianu, Sfatul domnesc si adunarea starilor in principatele Romane (Bucharest: Editura 
Enciclopedica, 1995 [1947]), 22: the author stresses the meaning of țara as a legal community. See also Daniel 
Barbu, Bizanț contra Bizanț (Bucharest: Nemira, 2001), at 88 where the author emphasizes the discontinuity 
between the ‘country’ and the ‘state’, the first one being a distinct entity which played a key role in the dialectics 
of power between the prince and the nobles.  
 17 
that it was the country, that is the constitutionally organised ‘people’ which had 
suffered the tort of dictatorship. In other words, the passive subject of the crime is 
already the legally constructed ‘people’, understood here as an abstract legal body. 
In this sense, not only the state reframes itself through the process of criminalisation, 
but also restates and redefines the people as a constitutive part of the polity. 
  
 The postwar trials developed in this legal framework have been regarded by 
commentators as a rather problematic attempt in dealing with the trauma of the war 
and in assigning responsibilities66. It has thus been noted the limited extent of the 
scope of the war trials, the courts leniency towards some of the convicts as well as 
the random application of the law over territory especially in those areas in Northern 
Transylvania which during the war had been part of Hungary. As Maria Bucur 
points out, it can be noted a tendency in avoiding to deal with Romanian 
responsibility for the atrocities which was backed by an ideological conviction that 
responsibility lied within the foreign former allies – Nazi Germans and fascist 
Hungarians67. Topical in embodying the ethical confusion of the attempt of 
approaching Romanian Holocaust, the trial of Antonescu offers a series of extremely 
poignant examples as regards the legal and ideological construction of fascism and 
Romanian collaborationism. 
  
 Due to its importance, and especially to its high coverage in media, the 
communist faction in charge now with the machinery of justice organized the trial 
with care. As noted, the members of the Court and the accusers were carefully 
chosen through members of the party, access to the trial was limited to a selected 
audience, and special measures for keeping order were taken. The Court judging the 
trial was an extraordinary People’s Tribunal presided by Alexandru Voitinovici, 
                                   
66 Maria Bucur, Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth Century Romania (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2009), at 156. 
67  Ibid., at 156-158. 
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assisted by Constantin Balcu and 7 people’s judges, all members of the communist 
movement. The public prosecutors were two lawyers Vasile Stoican, seconded by 
Constantin Dobrian, a procurator at the Court of Appeal in Timișoara and a public  
accuser, Dumitru Săracu, without legal training, from the ranks of the Communist 
Party68. There were a series of accusations, organized around the lines of the actions 
of the former Marshal and of the legal framework that was into force. They 
concerned namely the unlawful war against the Soviet Union, the terror unleashed 
against workers and peasants, the ‘German colonization of Romania’, the economic 
disaster, the massacres, the deportations and the campaign of ‘Romanianisation’69. 
As we can notice, only a part of the accusation dealt explicitly with atrocities of the 
regime directed against its citizens and against inhabitants of the occupied 
territories, while the others were referring clearly to the abstract legal entity of the 
‘country’.  
 
 Indeed, in their struggle of redeeming the ‘country’ the accusers would stress 
out its sufferings. Two recurrent images will follow closely the accusation act and 
the interrogatory: that of the oppressed Romanian peasant forced to become a 
soldier, and that of colonized Romania. By overemphasizing the national disaster, 
the accusers come to a point where there would not be any distinction between the 
victims and the oppressors, a point where the very oppressors would appear before 
the world as victims. As stated by one of the public accusers : ‘there can be no 
difference between the massacre of those [Romanian soldiers] young people and that 
of the massacre in Majdanek’70. And as he continues ‘I can’t make any distinction in 
sending to death the youth of the Nation and the shooting in forest outskirts of 
deported people’71. The Conducător is, thus, guilty first and most of all in bringing a 
disaster on the country. The tort made wasn’t one perpetrated against millions of 
                                   
68 Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, at 249-250.  
69 Procesul marii trădări naționale (Bucharest: Eminescu, 1946), at 19-34. 
70 Ibid., at 284.  
71 Ibid. 
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expressionless victims, but to an abstract legal community which is through the very 
act of uttering of this words founded on a fundamental ethical confusion.  
 
 However, the central legal, political and semiotic problem here is not the 
responsibility of the Conducător, but the dynamics through which ‘the country’ 
receives its innocence by losing the Conducător. What the Trial is telling to the state 
and to the anonymous collaborators of the dictatorship is that most of them were 
victims themselves. Through accepting this complicity in the field of social reality, 
the legal order creates its ‘people’, its ‘country’ as it imagines them to be: ‘We are a 
modest people who never had expansionist tendencies. We had a sole mission: that 
of preserving our national being of a modest and working people, who never went 
out of its borders, who never did barbaric acts and always defended its land and its 
national being’72. This is one of the legal embodiments of Romanian Stalinist 
ideology, which embellishes a reality filled with diffuse anti-Semitism and 
oppression. One could note the peculiar resemblance between the ‘modest people’ 
fighting for their land and the ‘sacred war against bolshevism’ the same people 
would engage in years before as well as the radical disjunction between the historical 
real of giving way to the ‘eliminationist drive’ and the political symbolic negation of 
this real. 
 
 To put it in Benjaminian terms, the very point of approaching the issue of 
historical injustice, the lawyers and the public accusers turn away from articulating a 
discourse from the perspective of the ‘tradition of the oppressed’73. Rather their 
attempt is to redeem what was impossible historically to be redeemed. They turn 
their face from history in order to offer expiation to the state and its mechanism and 
along with them to the nation. From this point of view the Law before which the 
                                   
72 Id., 302. 
73 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Concept of History’, in llluminations, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt 
(New York: Shocken Books, 1969 [1940]), at 256 (T VIII).  
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Conducător is brought and before which the victims could seek release, refrains to re-
structure the power relations. The law doesn’t judge historical violence, because 
ontologically it is inscribed in a history of violence. As Walter Benjamin noted, ‘all 
[law] was the prerogative of the kings or of the nobles – in short of the mighty; and 
that, mutatis mutandis, will remain as long as it exists’74. As law is consubstantial with 
historical violence, addressing it legally is deemed to fail, except under a possibility 
to judge history itself, and thus to cut off with a tradition that instills that history 
should be that of the victors. The law, surpassed by mythical violence, fails to bring 
justice. What we are given in fact is the reproduction of the same mechanism of a 
culture tainted by barbarism, and linked inescapably to it, a mechanism of mythical 
violence75 reproducing itself under the masks of the revolution from above.  
 
Conclusion   
The trial of Antonescu, taken as a paradigmatic example of judging the past and 
constructing the new regime of legality, fails to address the material history of the 
Holocaust and the manifold forms through which the state as such participated in 
the criminal enterprise. By devising legally the crime as a tort against an abstract 
legal community that is already founded by the state, it came short in questioning 
the basic tenets of law’s and state part in the dissolution of the polity. This decision 
had dire ethical consequences – some of which I tried to point out here. It also had 
further political consequences as long as by seeking to legitimize itself through an 
ethical confusion, the Communist movement itself moved away from the tenets of 
international communism. It has symbolically embraced the national route, 
inasmuch as it renounced to its revolutionary stand and joined the sphere of state-
driven politics. Furthermore its legal consequences are even more compelling, for 
the focus on personal dimension of the perpetrators – even if accurate – prevented a 
                                   
74 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’ trans. Edmund Jephcott, in Selected Writings, vol. I, ed. Marcus Bullock 
and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999 [1921]), at 296. 
75 ‘There is no document of civilization that is not tainted by barbarism’: Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Concept of 
History’, at 257 (T VII). 
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discussion of the systemic dimension of the crimes. Law has thus failed to recognize 
its own suspension and continued its formless and confused existence from one 
dictatorship to the other.  
 
